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PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC INJURY: RESHAPING
THE IMPLIED CONTRACT AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO MALPRACTICE
STEPHEN R. FELDMANt AND THOMAS M. WARDf
Despite the enormous number of Americans who seek psy-
chiatric aid for their emotional problems, malpractice actions
against psychiatrists are surprisingly rare. In this Article,
Professors Feldman and Ward suggest that this state of affairs is
caused not by the extraordinary competence of the psychiatric
profession, but rather by the particularly severe legal obstacles
that confront injured psychiatric patients. The elements of the
traditional tort cause of action-especially causation-are not
easily proved by plaintiffs claiming psychiatric injury. More-
over, recent cases show that courts are growing even more un-
sympathetic to those patients who suffer most grievously from
unscrupulouspsychiatrists. To remedy thisproblem, the authors
reach to the historical origins of medical malpractice liability,
and advocate the revival of an implied contract to treat with skill
and care. By imposing afiduciary obligation on thepsychiatrist
in the performance of this contract, the authors overcome the
obstacles ofproof that arise from traditional tort law. This al-
ternative approach should bring a new balance to the law ofpsy-
chiatric malpractice, in which aggrieved patients will be
compensatedfor their injuries, but innovative practitioners will
not be unduly deterredfrom medical experimentation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Psychotherapy' is the only generally accepted healing art that can-
t Visiting Professor of Law, The University of Nebraska. A.B. 1959, Duke University;
LL.B. 1965, Fordham University, LL.M. 1972, Harvard University; M.A. 1979, University of Ne-
braska.
t Professor of Law, The University of Maine. A.B. 1965, University of Pennsylvania; J.D.
1968, Notre Dame University; LL.M. 1970, University of Illinois.
1. The term "psychotherapy" as used herein is strictly defined to mean the "talking thera-
pies" as they are sometimes called. This is in keeping with the generally accepted definition of
psychotherapy as the "[t]reatment of emotional, behavioral, personality and psychiatric disorders
based primarily upon verbal or nonverbal communication with the patient, in contrast to treat-
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not be pre-tested. At present, no method is available for evaluating a
"talking therapy" on nonhuman subjects. Therefore, the typical medi-
cal research model, which calls for careful testing of a substance or
technique on animals prior to use on human beings, is not adaptable to
psychotherapy.' Moreover, the testing of treatment techniques on
nonpatient human subjects is normally unproductive because these
subjects do not suffer the emotional disability that an experimental
therapy is designed to treat. The application of a psychotherapeutic
technique to a volunteer subject who is not in the throes of a psychic
disturbance will net the researcher very little. Thus, the administering
of innovative psychotherapy to an actual patient for the first time is the
ultimate test of whether it will work. Despite the limitations in the ex-
perimental methodology, it is generally agreed that there is need for
research and discovery in order to develop and refine treatment tech-
niques.3 Psychotherapy, in all its forms,4 is still an infant science with
much to learn about itself.' To advance the state of the art, the law
must afford the sincere innovator some leeway when a treatment tech-
nique undertaken in good faith proves unsuccessful. Yet the law can-
not leave the patient a defenseless guinea pig in the face of an
overzealous, irresponsible, or self-serving practitioner. To serve these
competing interests in the unique verbal context of psychotherapy, the
law must find the delicate balance that will protect the patient popula-
tion, and yet permit creativity and development in the healing art itself.
This article posits the existence of two serious problems in the
ments utilizing chemical or physical measures." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1167 (4th
unabridged Lawyers Ed. 1976). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (rev. 4th ed. 1971);
BLAKISTON'S NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 833 (1949); F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 272 (1966). For discussions of psychiatric malpractice
involving the use of chemical or mechanical means, see Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 597 (1965); Morse,
The Tort Liability of Psychiatrists, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 208 (1967).
2. The AMA has three ethics requirements for the use of experimental drugs or procedures
on humans: (I) the person on whom the experiment is to be performed must voluntarily consent;
(2) the danger of the experiment must have been previously investigated by animal experimenta-
tion; (3) the experiment must be performed under proper medical protection and management.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL Asso-
CIATION § 2 at 10 (1971).
3. See generally THE GOALS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (A. Mahrer ed. 1967); Rosenhan, On Being
Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCL 250 (1973); Note, Medical Malpractice The Liability of Psychia.
trists, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 693, 696 (1973).
4. For a brief explanation of a few of the more familiar schools, see Comment, The Liability
of Psychiatristsfor Malpractice, 36 U. PITT. L. REv. 108, 121-23 (1974). A more comprehensive
review of the currently respected schools is found in V. NoRDBY & C. HALL, A GUIDE TO PSY-
CHOLOGISTS AND THEIR CONCEPTS (1974).
5. See Comment, supra note 4, at 121-23, 132; Comment, Tort Liabiliy of the Psychothera-
pist, 8 U.S.F. L. REv. 405, 409-11 (1973).
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present law controlling the therapist-patient relationship. The first
problem arises because most actions brought against therapists for inju-
rious conduct are grounded in the tort of malpractice,6 which, due to
several difficult problems of proof, unduly favors the doctor. Second,
there is emerging in the cases on psychotherapeutic malpractice the cu-
rious, and to some extent successful, defense that certain injurious con-
duct is sufficiently nonprofessional to insulate the doctor from
malpractice liability because he is no longer practicing. The most dis-
turbing example of this "nonpractice" conduct occurs when a therapist
takes advantage of his patient's vulnerability in order to gain sexual
intimacy or monetary advantage. In response to both problems this
article advocates an even-handed solution that flows directly from a
clarification of the true nature of the doctor-patient relationship. The
solution is grounded historically' and conceptually9 in a revitalized im-
plied contract to treat with skill and care. Conceptually the implied
contract should serve to broaden the doctor's obligation to use skill and
care. When this implied contract is appropriately invested with obliga-
tions in the nature of fiduciary duties' ° running from the doctor to the
patient, it becomes the basis for an independent cause of action when-
ever the therapist breaches his trust regardless of the patient's failure to
show a breach in the standard of care. Under this independent action,
corollary rules that historically attend contractual obligations invested
with fiduciary duties will, directly or by analogy, serve to distribute
equitably the benefits and burdens between the patient and the doctor.
6. D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 88 (1973).
7. But see Saxe, Psychotherapeutic Treatment and Malpractice, 58 Ky. L.J. 467, 478-79
(1970) (author predicts increase in psychiatric malpractice suits and suggests caution in exposing
the therapist to greater risk). Despite Professor Saxe's concern, only two cases ofpsychotherapeu-
tic malpractice have appeared in the appellate reports since his article was written in 1970 -
Anclote Manor Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), and Roy v.
Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Term 1976).
8. Blackstone informs us: "For it hath been solemly resolved, that malapraxis is a great
misdemeanor and offence at common law, whether it be for curiosity and experiment, or by neg-
lect; because it breaks the trust which the party had placed in his physician, and tends to the
patient's destruction." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122 (Sharswood ed. 1885) (footnote
omitted). Authority for that statement is cited in note 8 to the text: "The law implies a contract on
the part of a medical man, as well as those of other professions, to discharge their duty in a skilful
and attentive manner. ... Id.
9. See generally Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WASH.
U. L.Q. 413.
10. D. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 17 (1973); Dawidoff, The Malprac-
tice of Psychiatrists, 1966 DUKE L.J. 696, 702-03.
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II. THE PRESENT PROBLEM WITH THE LAW OF MALPRACTICE
Absent the screening function of state examination boards and li-
censing requirements," t the only legal protection a patient has against a
therapist who causes him psychic injury is a malpractice action for
damages. This remedy is largely illusory. 2 Problems of proof are im-
mense. In order to establish aprimafacie case of malpractice the plain-
tiff must adduce evidence on four basic allegations 13 (although the first
two are intertwined):
1. the standard of care to be applied, which is established by
the profession for a practitioner of the healing art;
2. the breach by the defendant doctor of the standard;
3. the actual injury of the plaintiff;
4. the proximate causation of the injury by the breach.
It is the unique verbal character of psychotherapy which makes the
proving of each one of these allegations problematical.
A. The Standard of Care and the Breach
To demonstrate that an act or omission of the therapist violated
the standard of care that the law demands of a practitioner, the plaintiff
must first establish the accepted level of professional skill existing in
the medical community in which the doctor practices.' 4 This is done
by the testimony of expert witnesses.' 5 Obtaining this expert testimony,
however, presents a problem common to all malpractice suits. It is ex-
tremely difficult to get any professional to testify against his brethren.' 6
But assuming this testimony can be procured, the difficulties of estab-
lishing a clear standard of skill and care remain. Psychotherapy is a
11. See generally Note, Regulation of Psychological Counseling and Psychotherapy, 51
COLUM. L. REv. 474, 492-94 (1951).
12. In reviewing the difficulties inherent in a malpractice suit, Robert Strodel, an experienced
plaintiff's attorney, states: "It is difficult enough to prove the merits of the claim when playing in
the physicians' ball park. It is virtually impossible to prevail if the client is not saleable as an
individual." Strodel, Medical Malpractice-A Primerfor Attorneys, 1978 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q.
121, 123-24.
13. E. SAGALL & B. REED, THE LAW AND CLINICAL MEDICINE 117 (1970). See generally D.
HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973); 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE (1977 & Supp. 1978).
14. Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 606 (1965); see McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Praci-
tioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 558 (1959). But see Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d
981 (1974), in which the court held that the failure of an ophthalmologist to give a glaucoma test
was negligence as a matter of law regardless of the standards of the ophthalmology profession.
15. Comment, supra note 5, at 419.
16. See Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 520 (1965).
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young science with few principles that are universally accepted. 7 If the
allegedly breaching psychotherapist can show that his actions or modes
of treatment are condoned by a respected minority of practitioners, he
is virtually insulated from liability.'8 Courts have recognized that in a
changing science a physician is not liable for mistakes in judgment
when a matter is more or less unsettled or when physicians might rea-
sonably differ.' 9 In the field of psychotherapy, which accepts schools of
thought ranging from Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy20 to B.F.
Skinner's operant conditioning,2' there is a great deal of room for de-
bate about proper modes or techniques of treatment. Thus, it is an
enormous challenge to establish a standard against which to measure
the asserted dereliction of the psychotherapist. An experienced trial
lawyer in the malpractice field defined the general problem of estab-
lishing standard of care:
The legal aspects of medical negligence are relatively simple. It is
the proof of medical care deviations in what is admittedly an inexact
science that is the difficult aspect of such litigation.22
These observations are especially applicable to the infant science of
psychotherapy.
B. Psychic Injury and Causation
Should the plaintiff, through expert testimony, establish the breach
of a standard of care, or be excused from doing so due to the patently
extreme acts of the therapist,23 the next hurdles are to prove actual
17. Note, supra note 3; Note, Standard of Care in 4dministering Non-Traditional Psychother-
apy, 7 U. CALIF. D. L. Rev. 56 (1974).
18. Rothblatt & Leroy, Avoiding Psychiatric Malpractice, 9 CALIF. W. L. REv. 260, 263
(1973); Comment, Injuries Precpitated by Psychotherapy: Liability Without Fault as a Basisfor
Recovery, 20 S.D. L. REv. 401, 407 (1975); Note, supra note 17, at 74-76; Comment, supra note 5,
at 419. See also V. NORDBY & C. HALL, supra note 4, which lists 42 respected psychologists and
the schools of thought they engendered.
19. Note, supra note 3, at 695.
20. V. NORDBY & C. HALL, supra note 4, at 147.
21. Id. at 156-59.
22. Strodel, supra note 11, at 131.
23. In a particularly bizarre case involving the actual beating of a patient by the therapist, the
court held there was no need for expert testimony because "the very nature of the acts complained
of bespeaks improper treatment and malpractice. ... Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 378,
165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (1960). For a full discussion of Hammer, see notes 122-
129 and accompanying text infra. According to Hammer, the doctor must go forward with proof
of compliance with an acceptable standard of care once plaintiff has shown evidence of apparently
extreme or unusual treatment. 7 N.Y.2d at 378, 165 N.E.2d at 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 67. This
evidentiary burden, however, is keyed exclusively to the issue of standard of care. The concept of
a shifting burden of persuasion is similar to part of the proposed solution in this article, see notes
88-93 and accompanying text infra, but the issue about which it revolves differs, see notes 127-129
and accompanying text infra.
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injury and proximate causation by the acts or omissions of the defend-
ant. Both are formidable, but of these two the proof of actual psychic
injury can be less burdensome because it can often be demonstrated by
consequent physical symptoms.24 Case law now has a long history of
allowing recovery for nonimpact torts that have caused physical dis-
comfort through the infliction of fear or fright, whether intentionally or
negligently occasioned.25 Absent physical consequences, however, the
plaintiffs task is difficult. While he is not precluded from testifying on
his own behalf, or presenting lay witnesses who can accurately report
his altered mental or emotional condition, such evidence, lacking pal-
pable substantiation, will naturally be viewed more skeptically by a
court or jury. Nevertheless, if the testimony is credited, the allegation
of actual injury is proven. 6
Establishing the causal link between the psychotherapist's breach
and the injury is the most difficult burden of proof for the plaintiff.27
The historic lack of psychotherapeutic malpractice cases in the courts
has been attributed to this problem.28 The initial obstacle for the pa-
tient is to show any cause at all. Almost nothing is known about the
normal course of mental or emotional illness. While psychotherapists
will presume to evaluate and categorize the nature and magnitude of a
patient's problem,29 none will predict the "normal course" the illness
will take beyond speaking in general terms of optimism or pessimism.
The ability to pinpoint the cause or causes for improvement or degen-
eration in a patient's condition during treatment remains largely be-
yond the present knowledge in the field. A patient's condition may
sharply alter for better or worse without explanation. Set in this matrix
of mystery, the plaintiffs burden of showing the proximate causation of
injury attributable to a particular act or omission of the therapist is
24. Dawidoff briefly lists "beating or compensation neuroses such as hives, acne, upset stom-
ach." D. DAWIDOFF, supra note 10, at 70. But the range of physical manifestations of mental or
emotional illness is as varied as the individual patient.
25. For a full history and review of the development of nonimpact tort recovery, see Lam-
bert, PersonalInjury (Tort) Law, 28 NACCA L.J. 33 (1961).
26. Whaley v. Fowler, 152 Cal. App. 2d 379, 313 P.2d 97 (1957).
2. Tarshis, Liabilityfor Psychotherapy, 30 U. TORONTO FACULTY L. REv. 75, 96 (1972).
28. Note, supra note 17, at 65.
29. The accepted diagnostic guide, which establishes categories of mental illness, is the
American Psychiatric Association's DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS (2d ed. 1968), known in the mental health field simply as "DSM-2." See Note, situra note 3,
at 700-02, for a discussion of the unreliability of diagnostic efforts. Failure of a state mental
hospital to diagnose accurately has been held not to be a basis for holding the state liable when the




indeed heavy.3" Because psychic injury is by definition nonphysical,
though physical consequences may sometimes exist, there is nothing
like the neat causal clarity of a sponge left in an incision that might be
available as proof to the surgical malpractice plaintiff.
After considering the problems of proof involved in establishing a
primafacie case of psychotherapeutic malpractice (standard, breach,
injury and causation), one can reasonably conclude that this form of
protection for the patient and control of the doctor is not a very useful
mechanism. Add to this a natural reluctance on the part of the patient
to parade his illness before lawyers, judges and jurors, and the emo-
tional difficulties that might attend a suit against a therapist who once
held a deeply meaningful and trusted position in the plaintiff's life, and
it is understandable that only seven cases of psychotherapeutic mal-
practice have appeared in appellate reports in the last 20 years. Of
those seven cases, only two involved direct actions by patient against
therapist.3 ' Of the others, one was brought by the guardian of the pa-
tient,32 two were brought by the husbands of the patient after the pa-
tient-wife had divorced the plaintiff33 or committed suicide,34 and two
actions were against insurance companies that refused to appear and
defend under the policy and later disclaimed malpractice liability cov-
erage after the plaintiff recovered a judgment in the main action.35
When estimates of the number of mentally ill in the United States
range as high as twenty million,36 and a major part of their treatment
involves psychotherapy, one must agree with the commentator who
said, "(1) either psychiatrists have reached near perfection in the con-
duct of therapy, or (2) something is amiss."37 If, in fact, something is
amiss in the law of psychotherapeutic malpractice, one need only in-
spect the cited cases to find a line of reasoning that appears to be going
30. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 18, at 264; Note, supra note 3, at 697. See also Dawidoff,
The Malpractice of Psychiatrists, 1966 DUKE L.J. 696, 712.
31. Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Term 1976); Landau v. Werner,
105 Sol. J. 257, a#'d, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961).
32. Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
33. Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968).
34. Anclote Manor Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
35. Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1968); Hartogs v. Employers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 89 Misc. 2d 468, 391 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
36. D. MARTINDALE & E. MARTINDALE, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW: THE CRUSADE
AGAINST INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION at vii (1973). But see Comment, supra note 18, at 401
(only two million people are actually in treatment annually).
37. Comment, supra note 4, at 136. An insurance survey in Southern California reported
only 37 claims of psychiatric malpractice for the period between 1958 and 1967. Slawson, Psychi-
atric Malpractice: 4 Regional Incidence Study, 126 AM. J. PSYCH. 1302, 1303 (1970).
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even further in the direction of psychotherapeutic immunity from lia-
bility. Thus far we have discussed the problem only in terms of the
enormous difficulty of making out aprimafacie case of malpractice. A
new problem seems to be emerging for the plaintiff who makes out too
strong a case.
III. THE NEW PROBLEM WITH THE LAW OF MALPRACTICE
Should the therapist's dereliction be so clear as to leave no doubt
that he is no longer engaged in therapeutic treatment of the patient, the
plaintiff might conclude that his road to recovery has been made that
much easier. This, however, is not necessarily the case. It now appears
that the plaintiff is in distinct danger of proving himself out of his right
to compensation by the very strength of his evidence. The clearest ex-
ample of this phenomenon is Nicholson v. Han.8 In that case, Mr. and
Mrs. Nicholson were receiving marital counseling from Dr. Han from
1960 through 1962. The effort failed and the couple was divorced in
1962. Unbeknownst to Mr. Nicholson, however, his wife and Dr. Han
were having an affair for the latter half of that period. When Mr. Nich-
olson discovered this some years later, he filed an action against Dr.
Han alleging breach of contract, malpractice, assault and battery, tres-
pass on the case and fraud. The trial judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit
for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
appellate court explained that "[t]he [trial] court believed the substance
of the plaintiffs claim to be in the nature of an action for alienation of
affections, charging criminal conversation and seduction of a person
over the age of 18 or more years and therefore barred by statute. ' 39
The appellate court then affirmed the dismissal by agreeing that the gist
of the complaint, no matter how pleaded, was the tort of alienation of
affections and, in truth, such a claim was "squarely within the abol-
ished actions."'4
The Nicholson opinion establishes that the facts presented in that
case do not make out a claim of malpractice because the wrongs al-
leged are beyond "practice" in any professional sense. The court's ra-
tionale appeared to be that Dr. Han could not have committed the tort
of alienation of affections and have been ma/practicing at the same
time. The two were apparently mutually exclusive in the court's mind.
While this result may seem curious, particularly in light of the modem
38. 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968).
39. Id. at 36, 162 N.W.2d at 314.
40. Id. at 40, 162 N.W.2d at 317.
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day practice of permitting alternative and even inconsistent pleading,4"
this case cannot be passed over as merely aberrant. In the same year
that the Nicholson opinion was handed down in Michigan, the
Supreme Court of Missouri echoed the identical rationale in Zipkin v.
Freeman.
42
Mrs. Zipkin was treated for three years by the defendant psychia-
trist. During that time, her symptoms of extreme nervousness were
markedly improved and she suggested terminating the therapy. Dr.
Freeman persuaded her to continue in his care, in the course of which
Mrs. Zipkin became sexually intimate with him, divorced her husband
at his suggestion, loaned him $14,000 to buy a farm, moved onto and
worked the farm, stole suits of clothes from her former husband for
defendant's benefit and sewed his labels in them, participated in nude
swimming parties, perjured herself in frivolous lawsuits against her
own relatives at his instigation and turned over to him child support
that she was receiving from her former husband.
Once free of his influence, Mrs. Zipkin brought a malpractice suit
against Dr. Freeman and recovered a verdict of $17,000. The doctor's
insurance company, however, refused to defend and disclaimed cover-
age. The posture of the instant case was a garnishment proceeding in
which the court treated the insurer as defendant. The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, upheld the garnishment by a six to one decision. Only
three judges, however, were willing to characterize the defendant's ac-
tions as malpractice. The remaining three, in a concurring opinion,
stated flatly that Dr. Freeman did not malpractice:
[M]any of the acts of Dr. Freeman did not constitute malpractice, nor
did they have any true relationship with professional services per-
formed or omitted .... this relationship (and the doctor's acts)
passed the point at which anyone could logically believe that they
had any reasonable connection with professional services, or that
they were being performed in the course of any legitimate treatment.
In other words, the 'treatment' ceased, and an ordinary, person to
person, invasion of plaintiff's rights, civil or criminal or both, be-
gan.43
To capsulize the point, it seems that if the acts or omissions of the
therapist done under the guise of practice are sufficiently unrelated to
professional services, as the court understands them, he is no longer
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)2. See also 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1283 (1969).
42. 436 SAV.2d 753 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1968).
43. Id. at 764-65 (concurring opinion).
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practicing therapy, and, therefore, cannot be malpracticing. The three
concurring judges allowed the garnishment only because the manner of
presentation of the evidence did not enable them to distinguish acts of
possible malpractice from other torts or crimes perpetrated by the de-
fendant." Again, the import is clear. If plaintiff alleges facts or
presents evidence that proves malpractice, but in. addition supports a
wrong characterized by the court as something other than malpractice
as well (Nicholson), or more than malpractice (Zipkin), then plaintiff is
in danger of proving himself out of his basic claim of malpractice,
Can it be argued that the rationale of the Zopkin concurrence is
applicable only to questions of insurance coverage, and, therefore,
would not pose a danger to the injured patient in his suit directly
against the therapist? (This would require us to disregard Nicholson,
but for the sake of argument and analysis we will do so.) The answer
may reside in two recent cases involving a New York psychiatrist
named Dr. Hartogs. The first suit, Roy v. Hartogs,45 was a malpractice
claim by the patient against the doctor in which the doctor's insurer
refused to defend and disclaimed coverage. The second, Hartogs v.
Employers Mutual iability Insurance Co. ,46 was a suit by the doctor to
recover the costs of having to defend the claim of Ms. Roy due to the
insurance company's refusal to do so.
Ms. Roy was in treatment to work out problems of lesbianism.
Under the guise of therapy, Dr. Hartogs became sexually intimate with
her. The affair and therapy continued for approximately thirteen
months when both were terminated. Ms. Roy then brought her mal-
practice suit and was awarded $150,000 in damages. On appeal, the
judgment was conditionally affirmed by a two to one decision.47 The
dissenting judge, however, again raised the curious danger of proving
too much:
[I]n my view this did not constitute malpractice .... I neither con-
done the defendant's reprehensible conduct, nor maintain that it was
not violative of his professional ethics .... But let him not be con-
victed of his acts of misfeasance and malfeasance by virtue of an
action in malpractice.48
He then went on briefly to explain that the wrong done to Ms. Roy was
44. Id. at 765 (concurring opinion).
45. 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Term 1976).
46. 89 Misc. 2d 468, 391 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
47. The Appellate Court invoked remittitur and reversed and remanded the case for trial on
the issue of compensatory damages only, unless plaintiff agreed to a reduced judgment of $25,000.
85 Misc. 2d at 893, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
48. Id. at 894-95, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 591-92 (dissenting opinion).
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essentially a seduction, and because that cause of action was barred by
state statute, the complaint should have been dismissed, citing the Nich-
olson case. While this opinion is merely a dissent, it is nonetheless
significant because there was no question of insurance before this court.
The issue of coverage velnon was not guiding this judge's decision, and
the adoption of Nicholson was on the merits.
The question of malpractice insurance coverage was, of course,
squarely presented when Dr. Hartogs filed suit against his insurer. The
trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant insurance company, holding no coverage.4 9 Here, Dr. Hartogs
argued that he must be covered by the insurance contract because a
jury had already found him liable for malpractice in the Roy suit. The
insurance company countered with the argument of the Roy dissent
that Dr. Hartogs' actions did not constitute the practice of psychother-
apy, and therefore were not malpractice. The trial court said:
They are both correct. A distinction should be drawn in a factual
situation such as this between medical malpractice in the mind of the
patient and medical malpractice in the mind of the doctor. Plainly
when the patient submitted she believed that appropriate medical
therapy was being administered .... On the other hand, the doctor
administering the 'treatment' at all times knew ... that what he was
doing was in no way pursuant to the doctor-patient relationship.50
This neat solution suggests that a patient may claim malpractice
against the doctor if she is injured when she believes she is being
"treated," but that belief is not binding on the insurance company in a
claim by the doctor for indemnification. The insurance company may
legitimately disclaim coverage if the doctor knows his actions are not a
part of the treatment. The Hartogs court supported its distinction with
an ethical policy statement: "To hold otherwise would be to indemnify
immorality and topay the expenses of prurience."'I This dicta is itself
seductive but turns out to be perfectly circular. The court evidently
realized that, despite its nice distinction allowing liability to turn on the
subjective state of mind of either the patient or the doctor, depending
upon who is the plaintiff, the reality was that the patient, in all likeli-
hood, would go uncompensated if there were no insurance coverage of
the doctor. It therefore suggests a direct cause of action for the patient
against the insurance company. The court's clear implication is that in
49. Hartogs v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 89 Misc. 2d 468, 391 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct.
1977).
50. Id. at 470, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
51. Id. at 471, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
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such a suit the patient's state of mind controls. Herein lies the begin-
ning of the circle. The patient will thus be able to reach the insurance
funds even though the doctor cannot because he knew he was not prac-
ticing. The court explained its policy in this fashion: "No longer is it
the law in this state 'that the liability policy existed solely for the benefit
of insured.' The courts recognize that the injured person also is to be
protected."52 Under the court's view of the insurance law of New York
an injured party was allowed a direct action against the insurer even
though the insurer had properly disclaimed coverage against its own
insured. This extension of the limited direct action authorized by sec-
tion 167 of the New York Insurance Law finds little support in the
language of the statute itself. 3 This dicta is even more troublesome
52. Id. at 470, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 964 (citations omitted).
53. Section 167(l)(b) of the New York Insurance Law provides that personal injury liability
insurance policies issued or delivered in New York must contain:
(b) A provision that in case judgment against the insured or his personal representative
in an action brought to recover damages for injury sustained or loss or damage occa-
sioned during the life of the policy or contract, shall remain unsatisfied at the expiration
of thirty days from the serving of notice of entry of judgment upon the attorney for the
insured, or upon the insured, and upon the insurer, then an action may, except during a
stay or limited stay of execution against the insured on such judgment, be maintained
against the insurer under the terms of the policy or contract for the amount of such
judgment not exceeding the amount of the applicable limit of coverage under such policy
or contract.
N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 167(1)(b) (McKinney 1966). It is further provided in subsection (l)(d)
that the policy must contain a provision to the effect that a claim made by the insured or any other
claimant, including the injured party under subsection (l)(b), shall not be invalidated/or/alure to
give the notice required under the policy if it is shown that notice within the contractual limits was
not reasonably possible and thereafter was given as soon as reasonably possible. Id. § 167(l)(d).
Liability policies without these mandated provisions will be construed as though they did conform
under § 143 of the New York Insurance Law. Together these sections are designed to prevent the
insurer from benefitting from a windfall defense against the injured party whenever the insured is
delinquent in giving notice to his insurer. The statute simply mandates a provision forgiving the
claimant when notice is given outside the policy limits but as soon as possible in a situation where
noncompliance is understandable. The claimant may be the injured party if he falls within sub-
section (1)(b). The statute contains no hint that the legislature intended to provide an injured
party under subsection (1)(b) with a ground for recovery against the insurer when the injury is
outside the scope of the coverage contracted for by the insured.
For its expansive reading of § 167 Hartogs draws language and support from Lauritano v.
American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 3 A.D.2d 564, 162 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1957), aj'dmem., 4 N.Y.S,2d
1028, 152 N.E.2d 546, 177 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1958). Lauritano is merely an application of§ 167(1)(b)
to the case of an injured passenger who recovered a judgment against the insured and upon failing
to satisfy the judgment sued the insurer. The insurer's motion to dismiss was granted at the trial
because the required notice had not been given under the policy. 3 A.D.2d at 567, 162 N.Y.S.2d at
555-56. The Appellate Division reversed, relying on § 167(l)(d) and finding that notice by the
injured party could not have been reasonably expected within the policy limits and was given as
soon as reasonably possible. Id. at 568, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 557-58. In referring to subsection (l)(d)
the Lauritano court uses the following language: "Today the injured party is no longer wholly
dependent upon the diligence and conscientiousness of the person who caused him injury." Id. at
567, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 556. This language is expanded beyond the confines of § 167(l)(d) by the
dicta in Harogs. Lauritano had only the specific notice-forgiving provision in mind when this
language was written. In fact, part of the holding in Lauritano expressly contradicts the Hartags
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because it brings the court full circle from the point of view of the in-
surer. The company apparently need not pay its insured doctor if he
knew he was not treating the patient, but, according to the court's con-
struction of section 167 of the New York Insurance Law, it must pay
the patient who is unsuccessful in satisfying a judgment against the
doctor if she thought she was being treated by him. Surely, the insur-
ance company cares very little whether its check is made out to the
patient or the doctor. Even though the insurer's liability may not be
triggered until the injured party fails to obtain satisfaction against the
insured doctor, the court's suggestion does considerable violence to the
reasoning supporting the holding in Hartogs, because when the dust
settles the insurer winds up having to "indemnify immorality and pay
the expenses of prurience." The court has simply cut out the middle
man.
The discussion above is based on the Hartogs court's implication
that it is the patient's state of mind that is controlling in a direct action
against the insurer. If, however, we posit the alternative that it is the
doctor's state of mind that is controlling in the patient's direct action
against the insurer, the result is even worse. It bars the plaintiffs recov-
ery as completely as it barred the doctor's recovery in Hartogs. It is, in
fact, the Nicholson/Zkin result. If we assume that the injured pa-
tient's rights are controlled by the same definition of malpractice that is
applied when the doctor sues his insurer, then the narrow holding in
Hartogs of noncoverage might be extended to reach the Nichol-
son/Z#pkin result. But the Hartogs court avoids this extension by bot-
toming the injured patient's claim on her own state of mind rather than
that of the doctor.
Our Hobson's choice, then, is between one result that is totally cir-
cular and inconsistent with the policy that spawned it (as well as based
on a tenuous construction of the applicable insurance law), and an-
other-leaving the plaintiff without recovery-that the court itself finds
unacceptable. Thus, there is no clear answer in Hartogs to the question
whether the definition of malpractice in a suit by the patient is gov-
erned by an insurance contract or by tort law. In other words, the theo-
retical question posed above of whether it is only an insurance issue
when the patient proves too much, or whether the patient's suit against
dicta. There were two original insured defendants in Lauritano. Plaintiff was a judgment creditor
as to both before he sued their insurers. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's dismissal
as to one insurer because the injury was outside the scope of the policy issued to the insured. Id.
at 566, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
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the doctor is also jeopardized, is still an open one. But as a pragmatic
dollars and cents matter of recovery, according to all jurisdictions
outside of New York, the question allows of a definitive answer. If the
insurer is entitled to claim noncoverage because the doctor's acts or
omissions are essentially in the realm of the bizarre, the injured patient
will go uncompensated." If a theoretically permissible malpractice suit
directly against the doctor does remain in the extreme fact situation
cases, the patient who proves too much will be holding a judgment that
is unenforceable against the insurance company.
Thus, the unique verbal nature of psychotherapy, the peculiarly
difficult problems of proof involved in the traditional malpractice claim
against a therapist, and the emerging theoretical and practical impedi-
ments to recovery in the extreme cases, all suggest that the defendant
doctor is unfairly protected from liability. This conclusion is justified
because, on the one hand, it is extremely hard to make out aprimafacie
case of malpractice, and, on the other hand, if the case is made too
spectacularly, the injured plaintiff may wind up equally empty-handed.
This twin problem calls for a remedy that is tailored to solve both
problems at once. We suggest that such a theory presently exists and
only waits to be properly applied.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION-THE IMPLIED CONTRACT TO TREAT
FAITHFULLY
The solution consists of three parts: (a) retain the traditional ac-
tion of malpractice as Count I of any claim when it is appropriate;55 (b)
resurrect the original concept of an implied contract 56 to treat with skill
and care as Count II of the claim; and (c) recognize that the true con-
tractual relationship of the doctor/promisor to the patient/promisee is
54. The argument that most medical doctors are wealthy enough to pay a malpractice judg-
ment is too shallow. There are two reasons why this is not a sufficient argument: (1) most doctors
protect their wealth from personal liability through corporate or marital arrangements; and (2) the
basic assumption is not valid when dealing with Ph.D. psychologists who have not reached the
income levels of most medical doctors. Moreover, the facts of these two cases reveal that Dr.
Freeman was unable to pay, and Dr. Hartogs declared bankruptcy.
55. The retention of the malpractice cause of action will not be discussed further. The claim
is founded in the common law, and is theoretically valid for the plaintiff who manages to prove
the necessary elements without proving himself out of recovery. It will also allow a tort measure
of damage, which the proposed Count II will not, and there may be cases in which the tort remedy
is the more equitable. Allowing this tort recovery to the injured patient does not harm the opera-
tion or validity of Count II.
56. To avoid confusion at the outset, this is not the concept of express contracts to cure. For
cases dealing with that problem, see Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1238-44 (1972) and the discussion
accompanying notes 103-112 infra.
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a special relationship with fiduciary obligations running from doctor to
patient. This recognition would infuse the contract to treat with skill
and care with the obligation to treat faithfully and honestly.
The failure of the plaintiff's bar to emphasize the fiduciary nature
of the doctor-patient relationship, and the concomitant failure of the
bench to apply rigorously the principles of fiduciary obligations, has
permitted many of the problems of recovery that now beset many in-
jured patients. Both the "old" and "new" problems can be solved by
the full implementation of the fiduciary duties inherent in the implied
contract solution. The legal consequences that automatically flow from
the conceptual framework of Count II will enhance the patient's posi-
tion without unduly diminishing that of the doctor. The parties will be
on a fairer footing when they come to controversy over treatment.
V. THE COUNT II RECOMMENDATION APPLIED TO THE NEW
PROBLEM
The idea of basing a malpractice claim on the breach of an implied
contract to treat with skill and care is not a new one. 7 Indeed, the
separate tort of negligence has only been recognized for about a cen-
tury and a half.58 In the older cases "malpractice was regarded simply
as a form of breach of implied contract."59 Yet, because early practi-
tioners usually pleaded contract and tort in the alternative (or even in
one paragraph, alleging the defendant "negligently" breached his con-
tract), malpractice has been recognized as "a somewhat blurred area of
contract and tort law."6 Today the majority view sees malpractice as a
negligent tort,6 albeit a tort that is "inextricably bound up with the
idea of breach of implied contract."62 The growth of the case law sug-
gests a steady movement away from contract towards tort as the latter
appears to be a more inclusive concept.6 3 The tort theory of recovery
permits greater damage awards, and the tort statute of limitation is gen-
57. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8; Vanhooser v. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487, 491, 3 S.W. 72, 73
(1887); Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.H. 460, 468-72, 59 Am. Dec. 388, 390-93 (1853).
58. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at § 8.01 (1977).
59. Miller, supra note 9, at 413.
60. D. HARNEY, supra note 6, § 1.2 at 8. Other commentators agree: "This problem histori-
cally has caused and continues to cause considerable confusion." 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
supra note 13, § 8.03 at 194 (1977).
61. D. HARNEY, supra note 6, at 248.
62. Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1959).
63. See Miller, supra note 9, at 413-16, for a brief history of this transformation.
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erally regarded as more appropriate for these suits.64 While there is no
evil in casting a malpractice suit in tort or implied contract at the op-
tion of the pleader (provided he understands the problems of differing
periods of limitations and measures of damages), the danger of proving
too much, discussed above, arises only when malpractice is seen as a
cause of action exclusively in tort.
The paradox of the doctor not malpracticing because he was no
longer practicing at all can only occur when the law woodenly insists
on defining his breach as negligence in his supposed function. The ra-
tionale we have reviewed is that the therapist cannot be negligently
practicing therapy if he is not, in fact, practicing therapy on the occa-
sion of the injury. This rationale is in error because it forgets that the
roots of the practitioner's liability for malpractice are grounded in the
implied contract to treat with skill and care. The obligations of the
practitioner in either tort or contract should be identical. 65 But today
they are not. Legal forgetfulness has allowed the nominal distinction to
become significant. Courts now often assume that there is a smaller
ambit to the duty of care when the claim sounds in tort rather than
contract. It should be observed that in this instance the tort theory has
become rigid because it grew in ignorance of its history.66 Because of
this error we have seen the "new" danger of proving too much, as re-
flected in Nicholson and Hartogs, the concurrence in Ziokin, and the
dissent in Roy. If those opinions had harkened back to the genesis of
malpractice as a breach of implied contract they would have reached
the correct conclusion that the therapist had breached his contractual
duty to treat with skill and care, whatever the nature of the acts of omis-
sion or commission and whatever the characterization of his profes-
sional function. He could not be excused for simply having gone too
far from any conceivable therapeutic treatment. The tort analysis that
there is no liability because defendant was not "practicing" is exactly
the opposite result reached by the contract analysis, which finds de-
fendant liable because he was not practicing.
By adding part (c) of the proposed solution we can demonstrate
64. See I D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, §§ 13.02-.03, for a general discussion
and listing of all applicable statutes by jurisdiction.
65. Id. § 8.03.
66. Professor Gilmore has suggested that the absorption of contract doctrine into the more
flexible tort doctrine is the prevalant theoretical pattern. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
87-88 (1974). While psychotherapeutic malpractice is a deviation from this norm, its modem
development illustrates the error in forgetting that, historically, tort and contract occupy common
theoretical grounds.
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that the Count II recommendation not only solves the "new" problem,
but relieves the "old" problem as well. Part (c) recognizes that the spe-
cial consensual relationship of patient and doctor includes the fiduciary
obligations that flow from doctor to patient.
VI. THE COUNT II RECOMMENDATION APPLIED 'TO THE OLD
PROBLEM
We earlier identified the difficult burden of proof the plaintiff must
bear on each element of his primafacie case in the traditional malprac-
tice suit.6 7 By recognizing and clarifying the fiduciary principles that
inhere in the doctor-patient relationship, and functionally implement-
ing the fiduciary obligations that flow from doctor to patient in this
contractual context, much of this burden will shift to the defendant by
the operation of the law that attends fiduciary duties. A therapist, how-
ever, is not a true, legally defined fiduciary of his patient, and the con-
fusion that surrounds the term may be the reason full application of
fiduciary principles has been forestalled. While some commentators
and cases state flatly that a true fiduciary relationship exists, 68 this
characterization must be discounted as loose language. More careful
writers speak in terms of a "fiduciary matrix,"69 or a "relationship...
within an embryo of confidence,"' 70 or simply a "confidential rela-
tion."' 71 The reason for these more careful characterizations is that a
therapist may find that the absolute candor and complete disclosure
requirements of a fiduciary72 are therapeutically contraindicated by the
condition of the patient. For this reason, he may need to take what is
sometimes called the therapeutic privilege, and not disclose his diagno-
sis or proposed treatment.73 The best example of this necessity is the
therapist's use of the basic psychoanalytic tool of transference. 74 A pa-
67. See notes 11-37 and accompanying text supra.
68. Eg. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Bow-
man v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 800, 176 P.2d 745, 748 (1947); Lockett v. Goodill, 71
Wash. 2d 654, 656, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (1967). See also Tarshis, supra note 27, at 88.
69. Dawidoff, supra note 10, at 702-03.
70. D. DAWIDOFF, supra note 10, at 17.
71. A. ScoTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (3d ed. 1967).
72. Id.
73. Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 228, 377 P.2d 520, 525 (1962).
74. This phenomenon is explained in two footnotes to Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753,
755 n.1, 756 n.2 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1968), as follows:
1. "What is perhaps regarded as the most significant concept in psychoanalytical
therapy, and one of the most important discoveries of Freud, is the emotional reaction of
the patient toward the analyst known as the transference ** *," Modem Clinical Psychi-
atry, Noyes & Kolb, 6th Ed., 1963, p. 505.
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tient could hardly require the doctor to disclose completely the dynam-
ics of transference because a full and candid discussion of that process
would impede the operation of the transference itself, and thus impede
the therapy. With this clarification, we will continue to refer to fiduci-
ary "duties" or "obligations" with the understanding that the doctor is
not a true fiduciary by legal definition, at least with respect to full dis-
closure requirements.
In the pure tort approach to malpractice the plaintiff must adduce
evidence on standard of care, breach, injury and causation in order to
get to the jury. In the contract approach the plaintiff need only show
the existence of the contract,75 the breach of the fiduciary duty infused
in the contract, and the injury. Establishing the contract should create
no serious problem. The plaintiff either is or is not a patient in treat-
ment. Although the inventive mind might hypothesize a quasi-treat-
ment arrangement 76 that could raise doubts about the existence of the
necessary relationship, the proof of the doctor-patient contract nor-
mally would not hamper the plaintiff. Proving the breach would, of
course, be a more difficult task. Here the plaintiff must have evidence
of some act or omission that violates the contractual duty to treat with
skill and care. But because the doctor's duty is founded upon and is in
the nature of a fiduciary obligation to use the utmost good faith in the
application of skill and care, the basic requirements of a true fiduciary
"Inappropriate emotions, both hostile and loving, directed toward the physician are rec-
ognized by the psychiatrist as constituting a special aspect of the patient's neurosis-the
transference. The psychiatrist looks for manifestations of the transference, and is pre-
pared to handle it as it develops." Melvin S. Heller, M.D., Some Comments to Lawyers
on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 Temple University Law Quarterly, 401, 402.
"[Tiransference * * * In psychiatry, the shifting of an affect from one person to another
* * especially the transfer by the patient to the analyst of emotional tones, either of
affection or of hostility * Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 23rd Ed., 1957,
p. 1454.
"* * * Transference may be positive, when the feelings and reactions are affectionate,
friendly, or loving. * * * Understanding of transference forms a basic part of the psycho-
analytic technique." Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary, 2nd Ed., 1956, p. 1260.
2. In A Primer for Psychotherapists, Kenneth Colby, M.D. (1951) says, pp. 113-14,
"Once a transference is recognized, the therapist makes use of it in two ways. First by
evaluating what transference role the patient is forming, the therapist gains understand-
ing of what is being relived and re-experienced rather than being remembered *
"The second use made by the therapist of a transference is in regulating thefuture course
of therapy * * *" (Emphasis supplied.)
75. A doctor-patient relationship is consensual. Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183
(1940). A private physician is free to refuse service, but the duty of performance in the physician-
patient relationship exists even if the services are performed gratuitously. D. HARNEY, supra note
6, at 2, 9.
76. Nontraditional modes of therapy might blur the line between treatment and other rela-
tionships. See Note, supra note 17.
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may be properly invoked. Thus, the high standards mandated of a
trustee can be imposed, requiring the doctor to act with a fidelity above
the standards of the marketplace 77 and with "a punctilio of honor the
most sensitive."7 He must avoid all professional conflicts and situa-
tions tending to interfere with the discharge of his duties, 79 or situations
in which honesty may be a strain on him,1° and he must never take
selfish advantage of his trust.8' Under this standard the evidentiary
burden the plaintiff must bear is far easier in contract than in tort. The
question becomes not whether the doctor negligently failed to meet a
professional standard of care-with both aspects having to be proved
by the plaintiff-but whether the doctor breached his fiduciary duty of
good faith treatment. Examples of likely liability on the contract which
would be problematical in tort are: the doctor who is .attempting to
gather a number of patients for group therapy and includes the plaintiff
in order to reach, in his opinion, an optimal number of participants in
the group without considering the particular need of the plaintiff; the
doctor who is researching an innovative therapy technique and applies
it to a patient in the interest of research rather than the interest of the
patient; the doctor who maintains an extended supportive relationship
without informing the patient that the dynamics of the applied tech-
nique have run their course; or, of course, the doctor who becomes per-
sonally involved with his patient claiming he was no longer acting as
therapist in that regard.
The difficulty the patient might have as a plaintiff in the tradi-
tional tort malpractice suit is that group therapy, responsible research
and supportive therapy are all accepted behavior in the professional
community. The defendant would not lack for expert witnesses who
could validate his actions, at least facially, as well within the guidelines
of the profession. In other words, evidence of his breach of a standard
of care would be extremely elusive. Similarly, the therapist who
claimed his acts were unrelated to therapy would escape liability under
the "new" problem rationale. It is not suggested that the defendant has
an ironclad defense, but rather that the likelihood of plaintiffs proving
his case in tort is unfairly small. If the action were cast in contract,
however, the evidence needed would be only that the therapist
77. Buffum v. Peter Barcelaux Co., 289 U.S. 227, 237 (1932).
78. Wootten v. Wootten, 151 F.2d 147, 149 (10th Cir. 1945).
79. Sorrells v. Childers, 129 Ark. 149, 153, 195 S.W. 1, 2 (1917) (citing Burel v. Baker, 89 Ark.
168, 116 S.W. 181 (1909)).
80. Galbraith v. Tracy, 153 Ill. 54, 63, 38 N.E. 937, 940 (1894).
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 754 (rev. 4th ed. 1971).
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breached his fiduciary duty of failing to serve the best interest of the
individual patient, that he put his own research interest ahead of the
patient, that he failed to disclose readily disclosable and nonharmful
information to the patient, or that he was simply no longer practicing
under the terms and conditions to which his implied contract bound
him. The availability of this evidence to the patient is much easier than
the marshalling of reluctant and expensive experts necessary to prove
the tort elements of standard of care and breach by defendant. The
contract-theory plaintiff may offer his own testimony, and because it
relates primarily to the relationship in which he participated, he is com-
petent to relate it as a lay witness.82 The discovery process is also avail-
able to obtain from the doctor and his records8 3 the motivations for his
acts or omissions.
To complete his case in contract the plaintiff now must show ac-
tual injury. As to this element, there is no difference in burden of proof
under either the contract or tort theory. Psychic injury was evaluated
earlier as the less burdensome item of proof because it often can be
demonstrated by physical symptoms.84 Nonphysical injury or symp-
tomatology, however, is no bar.85 Lay witness testimony in the form of
opinion or inference is admissible to show altered emotional or mental
condition if the opinion or inference is "rationally based on the percep-
tion of the witness and. . . helpful to. . .the determination of a fact
in issue."86 Evidence of nonphysical injury, however, should be care-
fully weighed and scrutinized by the jury. Psychotherapy is volatile; a
patient may well have sharp swings in attitude, outlook and condition
in the course of a successful therapy. Should the timing of the claim
coincide with a negative phase of the patient's condition, he may ap-
pear injured when, in fact, the dynamic process of amelioration is well
under way.87 For this reason, the trier of fact must pay close attention
to the defense testimony as it has a much larger role to play under the
Count II structure we have been describing.
82. FED. R. EvID. 601, 602.
83. Id. 803(3), (6). The patient/plaintiff may also have a limited right to discover informa-
tion from other patient files to establish the doctor's motivation. See Lora v. Board of Education,
74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), in which the court granted plaintiffs motion for an order compel-
ling production of 50 randomly selected, anonymous diagnostic files, and stated that "[t]hese [psy-
chiatrist-patient privilege] rights are not absolute. They must be balanced against other important
rights and needs. In the special circumstances here presented ... the limited right or privilege to
protect therapist-patient interchanges must yield." Id. at 567.
84. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
85. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
86. FED. R. EvID. 701.
87. Saxe, supra note 7, at 479.
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VII. THE SHIFTING BURDEN OF PERSUASION
Once the plaintiff has produced evidence of the existence of the
contract, the breach of fiduciary duty and the injury, he has satisfied
the elements of aprimafacie case. Significantly, the element of causa-
tion has been deleted. It now becomes the defendant's burden to per-
suade the jury of noncausation and to present any rebuttal evidence
that might be directed at plaintiff'sprimafacie case."8 This shift of the
burden of persuasion is well grounded in the law of fiduciary obliga-
tions. Pomeroy tells us that it is a natural concomitant of being a
fiduciary:
The doctrine to be examined arises from the very conception and
existence of a fiduciary relation .... [B]ecause every fiduciary rela-
tion implies a condition of superiority held by one of the parties over
the other, in every transaction between them by which the superior
party obtains a possible benefit, equity raises a presumption against
its validity, and casts upon that party the burden ofproving affirma-
tively its compliance with equitable requisites, and of thereby overcom-
ing the presumption.8 9
Thus, it becomes the burden of the therapist, once the patient has
demonstrated injury and breach of contract, to show that he has not
breached his fiduciary duty, or, if he did, that the breach did not cause
the injury suffered by the plaintiff. His fiduciary status requires him to
take the witness stand to justify his actions as those of a responsible,
good-faith practitioner. Lest there be any doubt that the law imposes
this fiduciary burden on a therapist, Pomeroy further informs us:
Courts of equity have carefully refrained from defining the particular
instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner that other and per-
haps new cases might be excluded. It is settled by an overwhelming
weight of authority that the principle extends to every possible case
in which a fiduciary relation exists as afact, in which there is confi-
dence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority and influ-
ence on the other. The relation and the duties involved in it need not
be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.90
Therefore, clarifying the true nature of the doctor-patient relation-
88. This includes (a) no doctor-patient contract, (b) no breach of fiduciary obligation or (c)
no injury. Success on any one of these defenses will free the doctor from liability.
89. 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 956 (5th ed. 1941) (emphasis
added).
The shifting of the burden of persuasion on the issue of causation is not unique to the law of
fiduciaries. A bailee must bear the same burden upon a primafacie showing by the bailor of a
contract of bailment, delivery and failure or refusal to return the bailed property. See generally 8
AM. JUR. 2d Bailments §§ 313, 314, 316, 317, 321 (1963).
90. 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 89, § 956(a) (emphasis in original).
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ship, recognizing the functioning of the law that historically inheres in
this relationship, and permitting its natural application to the parties is
the very heart of the Count II recommendation. The normal operation
of the law itself now more equitably distributes the burdens of proof
and persuasion upon the patient and the doctor. Clearly the patient's
burden is lightened and the doctor's increased. The well-qualified and
responsible doctor, however, assumes no greater risk of liability than he
faced under the tort formulation. He can now avoid liability by either
justifying his actions as having been in "compliance with equitable req-
uisites" in that he did not breach his fiduciary contract to render treat-
ment in good faith or by showing that, regardless of their nature, his
actions were not the proximate cause of the patient's injury. The able
doctor, even when employing an innovative therapy, is in a strong posi-
tion to discharge either of these burdens. As to the first, he need only
explain what he did in the course of treatment, how he did it and why it
was in the best interest of his patient. If his testimony is clear and
cogent it will most likely serve, of itself, to vindicate him. Success or
failure of the experimental technique will be irrelevant because that is
never a proper test of liability in any medical malpractice suit absent an
express contract to cure.9 As to his second defense of no proximate
causation, his strength is in his own expertise as a psychotherapeutic
expert. He is qualified to give his opinion regarding the cause of the
injury, and he may testify that the injury was caused by extra-treatment
events, or simply by the unavoidable progression of the illness. While
this testimony is obviously self-serving and its credibility is lessened
thereby, the doctor will be able to buttress his explanation with his own
expert witnesses. If he cannot find colleagues to support his explana-
tion, then the jury, in the exercise of common sense, might properly
find against him.
A beneficial effect of this reallocation of burdens will be to
strengthen the field of psychotherapy itself. The able, thorough, re-
sponsible therapist will continue to experiment, innovate and advance
the discipline with little risk of enlarged liability. His protection is
founded on his own ability, rigor and judgment. He is the very practi-
tioner that the profession would want to encourage in his investigation
of the outer boundaries of the field. Once he understands what the law
requires of him, the responsible therapist will be little intimidated by it
because it obligates him to no higher standard than he would have im-
posed upon himself. The good therapist, without knowing the legal
91. See notes 104-112 and accompanying text infra.
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language, knows that the fiduciary role-the reposing of ultimate trust
and confidence-is the essence of effective therapy,92 and he would
never knowingly violate that trust. On the other hand, this high stan-
dard might do much to deter the dilettante or the irresponsible practi-
tioner from experimenting beyond his own capability. Once this lesser
therapist understands what the law requires, he will either attempt to
abide by its strictures or abandon the effort to go beyond the safe, well-
known and well-accepted modes of therapy. Both these results are sal-
utary. The law is thus employed to encourage the more talented practi-
tioner to expand his knowledge and abilities, and enhance the art,
while the journeyman is well advised to remain within the standard
procedures of established therapeutic techniques. 93
VIII. DAMAGES UNDER COUNT I-RESTITUTION EXPANDED
A. Traditional Measures of Recovery Under Count I-Tort and
Contract
When the plaintiff can prove the elements necessary to show that
the therapist departed from the appropriate standard of professional
care, he is entitled to those items of compensatory damages that he can
prove. Compensatory damages available under a negligence or mal-
practice theory usually include: (1) impairment of future earning ca-
pacity,94 (2) loss of accumulated earnings due to injury,95 (3) pain and
suffering,96 (4) curative medical expenses made necessary by the negli-
gence of the therapist97 and (5) the cost of the therapy itself to the ex-
tent that it did not, as a result of the negligence, independently benefit
the plaintiff.98
As previously noted, the historical antecedent to negligent mal-
practice was the action in assumpsit for breach of an implied contract
to treat with skill and care.99 Since the separate tort of negligence has
received distinct judicial recognition, it has all but supplanted the con-
92. D. DAwIDOFF, supra note 10, at 10; Tarshis, supra note 27, at 88.
93. For an analogy to the functioning of the concept of legal precedent, and its capacity to
put experimentation and scientific advance in the hands of the more skillful practitioner, see K.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 64-69 (1951).
94. Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Ariz. 1967).
95. McElroy v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp. 193, 198 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
96. Johnson v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 205, 212 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
97. McElroy v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp. 193, 197-98 (W.D. Ark.
1958), See also 4 M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 192, at 1049 (1959).
98. Beauchamp v. Davis, 309 Ky. 397, 404, 217 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1948).
99. See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
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tractual cause of action grounded on the physician's failure to exercise
appropriate skill and care. Today both theories of recovery stand for
the identical duty of due care. 100 Minor differences in the quantum of
damages, however, still appear in the cases.' 0' For example, nominal
damages are recoverable in contract but not under a negligence theory.
Thus, plaintiff might get the question of liability before a jury under
contract theory irrespective of the deficiencies in the proof on actual
damages. This distinction has little practical significance, however, in-
asmuch as there is no collateral incentive for any action in malpractice
that does not yield substantial damages. Despite this kind of minor
variation and the more common attempts to avoid a shorter tort statute
of limitations by sounding a malpractice action in contract, courts gen-
erally regard negligence as the essential theory of malpractice for dam-
ages purposes regardless of the pleadings. 10 2
Contract theory has more than token significance for damage pur-
poses when plaintiff alleges an express contract to cure. The express
contract is difficult to prove however. Courts are understandably skep-
tical about the express contract to cure or effect a specific result. Doc-
tors will seldom in good faith promise specific results and some patients
are prone to read into the optimistic small talk of the doctor firm com-
mitments never intended.10 3 When clear proof of such a commitment
exists, however, recovery may be premised on the express contract.'°4
When commitment is proved more attention is paid to the precepts of a
contract theory of recovery than is evident under the implied contract to
treat with skill and care-the harbinger of negligent malpractice. In
theory, the successful plaintiff in an action based on an express contract
is entitled to "expectancy damages," or that amount necessary to put
him in the position he would have occupied had the contract been fully
performed. Alternatively, contract theory provides an opportunity to
elect "restitution damages," the sum equal to the total benefit conferred
by plaintiff upon the defendant in the performance of a contract that
100. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, § 8.03, and cases cited therein.
101. Id. at 198.
102. See, e.g., Cloutie v. Kasheta, 105 N.H. 262, 197 A.2d 627 (1964); Darby v. Union Planters
Nat'l Bank, 222 Tenn. 417, 436 S.W.2d 439 (1968).
103. See Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 83, 188 N.W.2d 601, 613 (1971) (Black, J., dis-
senting). Often what the physician may consider words of encouragement are taken to establish a
definite guarantee or promise. See Johnston v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
104. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973). See also Annot., 43
A.L.R.3d 1221 (1972). Unless these actions are permitted when consent is clearly shown the pa-
tient public might fall victim to charlatans whose enticements are rooted in a routine commitment
to cure. See Miller, supra note 9, at 416-23.
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was materially breached. °5
Although some cases of contracts to cure have turned on a benefit
of the bargain rationale, the trend is toward other more flexible con-
tract remedies. 0 6  In the leading Massachusetts case, Sullivan v.
O'Connor,10 7 the supreme court rejected expectancy damages under an
express contract to correct and beautify plaintiffs nose. The Sullivan
court concluded that, unlike those for most commercial agreements, ex-
pectancy damages for breach of such a contract would usually be exces-
sive when measured against the consideration paid by the patient, and
that valuation of the expected resultant condition "may sometimes put
an exceptional strain on the imagination of the fact finder." 0 Restitu-
tion was also an alternative mentioned and rejected in Sullivan. Recov-
ery in restitution is traditionally measured by the value of the benefit
conferred on the defendant. In Sullivan, benefit was seen as equal to
the fee paid defendant, a recovery "plainly too meager" in the eyes of
the court.'0 9 The court opted instead for reliance as the measure of
recovery. Once thought of as a noncontractual form of recovery, reli-
ance damages have blossomed within the last generation as estoppel
begins to replace consideration as the cornerstone of promissory
105. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 and Comment a (1932). Contract recovery under
an express contract theory does not traditionally embrace pain and suffering. Frechette v. Ravn,
145 Wis. 589, 130 N.W. 453 (1911); 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, § 8.10; RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932). Notwithstanding this traditional prohibition, at least
one case in which liability turned on express contract recognized that strict adherence to contract
recovery is unrealistic when the essential harm is manifested in physical or mental injury. See
Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973). It might be convenient in such a
case to reason that pain and suffering is within the contemplation of the parties when the contract
is made and thus recoverable as consequential damages. In any case, when the pain and suffering
is connected with subsequent medical treatments that are necessitated by the unsuccessful medical
procedures under contract, damages for that injury should be recoverable as consequential dam-
ages. See id. at 588-89, 296 N.E.2d at 186-87. Because the contract theory is dedicated to giving
plaintiffthe value of his expected cure and not just to restoring him to his pre-injury condition in a
given case, the theory may yield a more comprehensive recovery than tort damages.
106. In the famous case of Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929), the defendant
physician contracted to make plaintiff's burned and disfigured hand "one hundred percent good."
Because the operation produced only a more "hideous hand," the physician was held to have
breached a contract, and the damage award was based on plaintiff's expectation of a "one hundred
percent good" hand. Id. at 118, 146 A. at 644. Hawkins has received considerable attention from
commentators and casebook editors over the years. See L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CON-
TRACT LAW 1-4 (3d ed. 1972); F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
111-13 (2d ed. 1970). See also Note, Civil Liability of a Physician for Non-wipi/l Malpractice, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 985 (1929); Note, 5 U. CHI. L. REv. 156 (1937). Despite this notoriety, even when
an express contract to cure can be found, courts generally have been hesitant to protect the expec-
tancy interest in the same manner as if they were dealing with a commercial agreement. See
Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
107. 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).
108. Id. at 586, 296 N.E.2d at 188.
109. Id. at 585, 296 N.E.2d at 187.
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liability. The concept of "reliance damages" is a flexible one that takes
on different definitional shades depending on the circumstances sur-
rounding the promisor's undertaking. In the context of the noncom-
mercial contract in Sullivan, reliance damages begin to resemble
compensatory tort damages."10 The elements of the damage award up-
held in Sullivan included plaintiff's expenditures and other detriment
incurred in reliance on the promise breached. The "other detriment"
in Sullivan included the amount attributable to the worsening of her
condition and pain and suffering incurred in a corrective operation. In
dicta the court went so far as to suggest that further pain and suffering
related to the operations contracted for might have been compensable
under a reliance formulation because the pain and suffering endured
was "wasted" when the operation failed. The issue was avoided, how-
ever, because plaintiff had waived any claim to pain and suffering for
the first two contractedfor operations in the event that defendant's ob-
jections on appeal were overruled. II
Sullivan's irregular application of contract doctrine serves the in-
stinct that an injured patient should be compensated regardless of the
theory of liability. It should not be surprising that the most significant
examples of this patchwork assimilation of tort and contract "reliance"
damages are occurring in the noncommercial context. This expansion
of reliance damage is fair, given the likelihood of jury confusion when
they attempt to apply a commercial contract theory of damages to an
apparent injury case that is presented as a suit on a private contract." 2
B. The Measure of Recovery Under Count II-Resitution
Unlike the "express contract" in Sullivan, the Count II contract
outlined above is not a contract to cure but only a contract to treat
faithfully and professionally. As such it may not be conceptually valid
or wise to follow the Sullivan track, which starts in contractual liability
and ends in a "contorts" vision of reliance damages. Reliance damages
that approach tort compensatory damages, as they did in Sullivan, seem
unwarranted when no cure was promised and no showing of negligence
is required. In addition, expectancy damages, which were rejected in
110. See G. GILMORE su.pra note 66, at 87-89. The trial judge whose instructions were upheld
in Sullivan on a reliance theory had no notion that the "reliance interest" was involved in the case.
His charge was not conceptualized around reliance at all. See R. DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROB-
LEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES 20 (1978).
111. 363 Mass. at 588-89, 296 N.E.2d at 189-90.
112. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373,
396-401 (1937).
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Sullivan as speculative and disproportionate in relation to the ex-
change,'13 would be even more speculative under Count II because no
cure is promised-only honest, faithful effort, the putative effect of
which is incalculable.
Restitution, on the other hand, should be available when the ther-
apist breaches the Count II contract. In the narrow sense in which res-
titution was viewed in Sullivan the patient would only be entitled to
recover fees paid to the therapist, in keeping with the traditional meas-
ure of restitution as the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant.
Restitutionary damages, however, are not as meager as Sullivan sug-
gests.
The Restatement of Restitution defines benefit conferred to include
the performance of a service "beneficial to or at the request of the [de-
fendant]." '" 4 Any actions of the patient that involve direct expense or
that involve costs in their performance might be fictionalized as "bene-
fit" if the therapist specifically requested that the acts be performed.
Under this definition, of course, benefit is a fiction and the real basis
approaches restoration for detrimental reliance. This expansive view of
restitution does not, however, include reliance damages to the extent
permitted by Sullivan. Sullivan would authorize disability damages
and pain and suffering as it stretches towards complete tort compensa-
tion. By sticking to restitution and broadening the benefit concept to
cover the cost of performing acts requested or recommended by the
therapist, Count II is clearly not an easy route to an expansive malprac-
tice verdict. While the cost of activities and extra correlative services
recommended by the breaching therapist would be recoverable under
Count II along with the full cost of the therapy," 5 items of compensa-
113. 363 Mass. at 585-86, 296 N.E.2d at 187-88.
114. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, Comment b (1955). See also Coleman Eng'r Co. v.
North Am. Aviation, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 396, 419, 420 P.2d 713, 728-29, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1, 17 (1966)
(Traynor, C.J., dissenting).
115. Somewhat analogous to the Count II contract to treat in good faith is the developing
doctrine on contracts to bargain in good faith in the commercial area. Professors Kessler and Fine
first suggested that there was such an obligation "instinct" in the cases although the existence of a
"contract to bargain" was denied and is still not overtly recognized. See Kessler & Fine, "Cu/pa in
Contrahendo, " Bargaining in Good Faith and Freedom of Contract: 4 Comparative Study, 77
HARV. L. REv. 401 (1964). Professor Knapp's formulation is set out in Knapp, Enforcing the
Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 673 (1969). The contractual duty to bargain in good faith
does not yield a certain standard for expectancy damages on breach. For that reason, Professor
Knapp rejects an expectancy measure in most cases. Id. at 723-24. He does conclude, however,
that reliance damages should be generally available. Id. at 723. Reliance in the commercial con-
text involves out-of-pocket costs or even lost opportunity costs, but not compensatory damages,
which might be brought within the scope of "reliance" in a noncommercial case involving injury,
such as Sullivan. To qualify under Count II and its corollary restitution principle, out-of-pocket
expenses would have to be recommended or requested by the therapist.
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tory damage associated with reliance in the express contract to cure
cases like Sullivan would not be recoverable. Pain and suffering and
disability, for example, would not fit within the restitutionary award in
Count II, although they could be recovered as compensatory damages
if plaintiff proved his malpractice claim under Count 1.116
The link between a restitutionary theory of recovery and liability
premised on the bad faith of the therapist finds some support in the
Florida case of Anclote Manor Foundation v. Wilkinson." 7 The plain-
tiff in Anclote, John Wilkinson, committed his wife to the care of de-
fendant hospital for psychiatric and medical treatment. The treating
psychiatrist was a full-time member of defendant's staff and had direct
supervision over Mrs. Wilkinson during her entire stay. In the course
of therapy, the doctor told Mrs. Wilkinson that he was going to divorce
his own wife and marry her. While there is no report of the doctor's
eventual marital status, the plaintiff, Mr. Wilkinson, obtained a divorce
from his wife shortly after she was discharged from defendant hospital.
Within a year, Mrs. Wilkinson committed suicide. Plaintiff husband
sued alleging breach of contract to render psychiatric services and mal-
practice. He prevailed on both counts, recovering damages in virtually
the exact amount he had paid defendant for its services. The trial judge
ruled that defendant's employee had malpracticed as a matter of law,
and the jury found breach of contract. Both findings were affirmed on
appeal. With respect to the contract count, the court focused on the
doctor's failure to treat in good faith, thus destroying "the possibility of
any benefit."" 8 Having found the record sufficient to support the jury's
finding of breach, the court went on to affirm as an appropriate recov-
ery a sum equal to "all [the] expenses incurred by him in the entire
course of treatment.""' 9 Neither the appropriateness nor proper extent
of restitution damages was discussed. Plaintiff's demand was appar-
ently limited to "full reimbursement for monies paid under the con-
tract."'120 Because the plaintiff was not the patient but the patient's
husband who paid the hospital bills, perhaps the plaintiff himself did
not think beyond reimbursement under the contract. Under Count II,
however, the plaintiff patient ought to be able to recover, in addition to
the cost of the therapy, any further direct or indirect expenses occa-
116. "Reliance" damages for pain and suffering and disability might also be recoverable
under the Sullivan rationale if an express contract to cure were found.
117. 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).





sioned by conduct of the patient undertaken at the recommendation of
the therapist.1 2'
IX. TESTING THE COUNT II RECOMMENDATION
The final test of the Count II recommendation is to apply it to the
seven cases that represent the existing appellate case history of psycho-
therapeutic malpractice to determine (a) if a different result would ob-
tain, and (b) if the altered result is a better one.
1. Hammer v. Rosen.'22 Defendant was a psychiatrist with a rep-
utation for an unusual and highly controversial treatment for
schizophrenics. His method was called "direct analysis," which in-
volved an attempt to treat the patient by locating her in the realm of
her infancy and bringing her up over again. 23 It also allegedly in-
volved beating the patient, for which acts, occurring over a period of
seven years, this malpractice suit was filed. The trial court dismissed
the malpractice claim at the close of plaintiff's case, but allowed a sec-
ond claim of breach of express contract to cure to go to the jury, result-
ing in a defense verdict. The New York Court of Appeals ultimately
affirmed the jury verdict, but reversed the malpractice ruling, remand-
ing for a new trial on that issue. Both the trial judge and the appellate
division had decided, in dismissing the malpractice claim, that the
plaintiff failed to make out aprimafacie case.'24 According to the ap-
pellate division she presented no expert evidence to show "that the
treatment given by the defendant was not consistent with good stan-
dards of professional judgment addressed to [plaintiff's] psychiatric
problem."' 25 In reversing, the court of appeals stated succinctly that
evidence of beatings presented by three lay witnesses, absent a credible
explanation, was sufficient to show malpractice even without expert tes-
timony. 126
Under the Count II recommendation, the ultimate result of al-
lowing the plaintiff to get to the jury would be the same, but two ap-
121. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
122. 7 A.D.2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1959), rev'd, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960); see Lambert & Rheingold, Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury
(Tort) Cases, 28 NACCA L.J. 63, 144 (1961).
123. See generally J. ROSEN, DIRECT PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHIATRY (1962); Rosen, A Method
of Resolving Acute Catatonic Excitement, 20 PSYCH. Q. 183 (1946).
124. 7 A.D.2d at 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06.
125. Id. at 216-217, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 806.




peals would not have been necessary to establish the effectiveness of lay
testimony to show violation of a standard of care. Under Count II, of
course, full compensatory damages would not have been available.' 27
The claim based on the revitalized implied contract to treat faithfully
would overcome a trial motion to dismiss because plaintiff clearly had
established the prima face elements of the action:
a. the contract is easily shown by the seven years of treat-
ment;
b. the breach is shown by the testimony of witnesses to the
beatings; and
c. the injury is shown by virtue of plaintiff's evidence in sup-
port of the court's finding of "regression rather than stabi-
lization of her [plaiintiff's] condition.' ' 18
At this point, under the Count II formulation, Dr. Rosen would
have the burden of showing either that the beatings were not a breach
of his fiduciary duty, but rather an innovative, albeit extreme, tech-
nique of treatment designed for the severe illness of the patient, or that
the beatings were not the cause of her regression. Persuading the jury
of either of these propositions would free the doctor from liability. The
court of appeals actually stated part of this formulation even though it
was speaking in tort-malpractice terms:
[T]he evidence ... indicating that the defendant had beaten Alice
on a number of occasions, made a primafacde case of malpractice
which, if uncontradicted and unexplained and credited by the try,
would require a verdict for the plaintiff.129
The court would thus have allowed the defendant to explain his actions
and avoid malpractice (in the court's terms) or breach of contract (in
our terms). In summary, the case was ultimately rightly decided in let-
ting plaintiff get to the jury. The Count II contract would have gone to
the jury without having to raise the puzzling problem of when the case
is established without expert testimony. In the next case, however, the
tort theory and the contract theory part company and produce opposite
results.
2. Landau v. Werner.'30 Plaintiff in this English case believed,
127. See text accompanying notes 113-121 supra.
128. 7 A.D.2d at 217, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (McNally, I., dissenting). We are dealing here with
psychic injury since no cause of action in battery was alleged.
129. Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 379, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66-67 (1960)
(emphasis added).
130. 105 Sol. J. 257, ai'd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (1961).
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after a fairly short time in therapy, that she was in love with her thera-
pist, Dr. Werner. The doctor diagnosed this behavior as a function of
the transference phenomenon and reassured her that these intense feel-
ings would pass. They did not, and the parties agreed to terminate
therapy, but maintain social contact to ease the separation. They had a
series of visits outside the office, discussed vacations together, and once
visited together in plaintiffs sitting room. Her condition deteriorated,
and she attempted suicide. Formal treatment was resumed, but to no
avail. The plaintiff sued and prevailed on a malpractice claim. The
trial judge absolved the doctor of any professional misconduct but
found:
[Wlith the best intentions in the world he had made a tragic mistake.
The departure from the recognised standard has resulted in gross de-
terioration in the [plaintiffs] health, and on the evidence it would
also amount to negligence in treatment. t 3'
The appellate court affirmed stating:
If his novel or exceptional treatment had failed disastrously he could
not complain if it was held that he went beyond the bounds of due
care as recognised generally. Success was the bestjustification for unu-
sual and unestablished treatment.'32
Though the appellate court noted that the trial judge "absolved the
doctor from all charges of professional misconduct,"'' 33 it upheld the
recovery. The case is wrongly decided and internally inconsistent. If
the doctor is "absolved of all professional misconduct," upon what is
the liability based? According to the court, liability is based on the
doctor's negligence. If he is negligent, it can only be as a therapist,
which amounts to professional misconduct. 134 Worse still is the
message the appellate court is sending to the field of psychotherapy-
"Success [is] the best justification for unusual and unestablished treat-
ment," and failure is equivalent to liability. It puts one in mind of the
grade B movie scenario in which the modem doctor in the heart of a
remote jungle must treat the stricken chief of a head-hunting tribe. If
he fails, he dies. This is hardly a policy that aids experimentation in an
infant science.
Under the Count II recommendation, Dr. Werner would have
been absolved of all liability on these facts because he never breached
his contract to treat with skill and care. He did his utmost to meet his
131. Id. at 258.
132. Landau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 1008, 1008 (1961) (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. See text accompanying notes 57-65 supra.
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obligation. If he failed, even if his failure caused the injury, he is not
liable. It is the policy of Count II to allow for good faith mistakes in
judgment. If Count II protects Dr. Werner simply because of absolute
good faith, when does that protection end? In other words, is any good
faith attempt at treatment protected no matter how horribly bungled?
The answer is yes under Count II, but no under Count I. Our formula-
tion contemplates the retention of the traditional tort claim of malprac-
tice whenever warranted. Under Count I, plaintiff may still recover for
negligent acts of a therapist, regardless of whether the acts were in good
faith. In Landau, for example, the plaintiff recovered on the ground of
negligence irrespective of the doctor's good faith. The next case, how-
ever, demonstrates one of the failings of the tort approach.
3. Nicholson v. Han.'35 The facts and holding of Nicholson have
already been described.'36 Dr. Han prevailed on summary judgment.
After having seduced plaintiffs wife while both were in marital coun-
seling with him, defendant never even had to take the witness stand.
The court ruled that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted because the gist of the wrong was seduction or aliena-
tion of affections, both of which were abolished by statute. The Count
II recommendation would reverse the result. Clearly, defendant
breached his contract to treat with skill and care. The resultant divorce
could be claimed as the element of injury because the Nicholsons re-
mained in counseling for another year after the covert liaison began.
Of course, Dr. Han could argue no causation in that the marriage may
have been inexorably headed for divorce, but he would scarcely be able
to avoid the proof of actual psychic injury to plaintiff by the incredible
deception. The contract theory at least would have allowed plaintiff to
get to the jury, and, most likely, prevail. Its application to this case
would not only have brought about a more just result, but also would
not have spawned the rationale that appeared in Ziokin v. Freeman,
Roy v. Hartogs and Harogs v. Employers Mutual. It is these cases,
along with Nicholson, that define the "new" problem previously dis-
cussed. 137 The Count II recommendation has already been applied to
these cases,' 38 and there is little to add. Under the Count II recommen-
dation, the Hartogs holding, and all of the cases that found the thera-
pist not to be practicing and, therefore, not to be malpracticing, become
135. 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968).
136. See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 38-54 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 57-65 supra.
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irrelevant and their conclusions are reversed. According to the contract
theory, not practicing under a contract to do so faithfully is precisely
the breach that comprises the actionable wrong.
There is one case that not only proceeds, in part, on the implied
contract to treat faithfully, but invokes restitution as the measure of
recovery.
4. Anclote Manor Foundation v. Wilkinson.'39 The facts of An-
dote are discussed above." Anclote might appear to be the perfect
two-count template that we have urged throughout this article. There
are four reasons why it is not: (1) the plaintiff was not the mistreated
patient; (2) his claim in malpractice was in a representative capacity; (3)
he had no contractual relationship with the treating psychiatrist; (4) his
contract with the defendant hospital was not invested with fiduciary
obligations running to him. Therefore, Mr. Wilkinson's claim could
not have been bottomed on the type of implied contract to treat with
skill and care posited above.
Even though not direct authority for the conceptual framework of
recovery in Count II, Anclote stands as an interesting and informative
analogy. The doctor's breach in Anclote was not a failure to exercise
due care but rather conduct that "destroy[ed] the possibility of any ben-
efit" which could have been anticipated.'41 It was the doctor's orienta-
tion toward the "acting out" of his feelings and away from patient
treatment as a primary concern that "destroyed the possibility of bene-
fit" and constituted the breach. The doctor's contractual obligations to
the plaintiff/husband in Anclote were not direct nor were they vested
with the same fiduciary standards as the doctor-patient contract envi-
sioned in Count II. If anything, however, the standard of good faith
treatment should be higher when the plaintiff is a patient.
In Anclote plaintiff was reimbursed for money paid under the con-
tract.' 42 Although the concept of restitution is more broadly stated in
the Count II recommendation, Anclote is also direct authority for the
damage theory recommended as a balance to the broader bases of lia-
bility posited in Count II. 4
139. 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
140. See text accompanying notes 117-120 supra.
141. 263 So. 2d at 257 (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. See text accompanying notes 113-121 supra.
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X. CONCLUSION
No dramatic innovation is suggested in the foregoing discussion.
While some may view the recommendation to revitalize the implied
contract in the context of good faith treatment as a major alteration in
malpractice theory, and even applicable beyond the realm of psycho-
therapy, the authors make no such claim. What is attempted instead is
an identification and clarification of the true nature of the therapist-
patient relationship and the legal consequences that naturally attend
that relationship. The patient/plaintiff is granted easier access to re-
covery through a contract theory, but damages in case of breach are
appropriately confined to restitution, albeit restitution in its broadest
sense. The responsible and conscientious therapist will be encouraged
to experiment and innovate in order to bring about the desired ad-
vances in the psychological disciplines. He need not be concerned
about the enlarged rights of the plaintiff as long as he does not break
faith with his patient and violate his fiduciary obligations. On the other
hand, the dilettante, the incompetent and the irresponsible will have
second thoughts before applying outlandish or faddish procedures to
an unsuspecting patient because they will no longer enjoy the overpro-
tection that present malpractice law affords. This result should be wel-
comed by the more talented scientist/practitioners who will take the
lead in discovery and development while the less able will be better
advised to remain within recognized and accepted modes of procedure.
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